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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
“In public, India and China expressed undying friend-
ship, but on the ground each was working to protect
its strategic interests.” (2)
Afters three decades of “freeze” following the warbetween the two countries in November 1962,India and China resumed diplomatic and trade
exchanges in the early 1990s. (3) Almost 32 years passed
between the official visit of Premier Zhou Enlai to India in
1956 (4) and that of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China
in 1988. Since the beginning of the current decade, bilater-
al diplomatic relations have improved dramatically, with each
year seeing several visits by heads of government or state, as
well as by ministers. (5) During Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to
India in April 2005, the two sides signed an agreement enti-
tled “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity.” In
2006, the two sides marked “friendship year,” and 2007 was
declared “year of friendship through tourism.” Exchanges of
official visits led to diplomatic advances of a symbolic nature
such as the reopening on 4 July 2006 of the Nathu La bor-
der pass between Sikkim and Tibet after 44 years of closure.
Likewise in trade the two countries have experienced a sub-
stantial thaw, as bilateral commerce, which was negligible
before 1991 ($260 million at best) is expected to reach $38
billion dollars 2008. (6)
The contrast is arresting when one compares the period of
tension and freeze that characterised Sino-Indian ties from
the late 1950s with the multi-directional acceleration of offi-
cial contacts since early this decade. While it’s still too early
to assess the real impact of this diplomatic warming, it’s nev-
ertheless interesting, given the growing weight of the two
Asian giants on the world arena, to consider the nature and
evolution of this bilateral relationship in the context of inter-
national relations and global trade. Have the two countries
really buried the rivalry and mutual suspicion that stemmed
from the 1962 military conflict? Are they embarking on a
fraternal entente of the kind symbolised by the early 1950s
slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” (7) that was so dear to
Nehru? More generally, could these warming diplomatic
and trade relations give rise to a strategic partnership similar
to that between the United States and Britain, or between
post-World War II Germany and France, leading to the
emergence of an Asian regional integrating force and a
major axis in international relations? On the economic
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B e t we e n  G e os t ra t e g i c  R i va l r y  a n d  E c o n o m i c  C o m p e t i t i o n ( 1 )
J E A N - F R A N Ç O I S  H U C H E T  
1. Another version of this article will be published in Jean-Luc Racine (ed), L’Inde et
l’Asie (India and Asia), Paris, Editions du CNRS, due for publication in 2009. 
2. For a description of India-China relations in the early 1950s, see Ramachandra Guha,
India after Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy, London, Picador India,
2007, 172 pp.
3. On Labour Day, 1 May 1970, Mao Zedong buttonholed Indian charge d’affaires Brajesh
Mishra and said, “How long are we going to be quarrelling like this? Let us be friends
again.” This statement marked the beginning of a thaw in bilateral relations, but six
years passed before concrete results in the form of an exchange of ambassadors in
1976. Dipankar Banerjee, “Perceptions of China from India ,” in Revista Portugesa de
Estudos Asiaticos, Vol. 2, 2006, n°10, pp. 19-34.
4. Premier Zhou Enlai visited New Delhi again in April 1960 with the specific mission of
holding face-to-face talks with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on the boundary issue.
5. The last was Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s January 2008 visit, which following
President Hu Jintao’s trip to India in November 2006.
6. Drew Thomson, “Singh’s Visit: Views from Beijing,” China Brief, Vol. VIII, n°4, 14 February
2008, pp. 8-10.
7. The slogan was launched during Zhou’s visit in 1956 to signify brotherly ties between
China and India.
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This article analyses the extent of the China-India diplomatic thaw since the early 1990s. Without ignoring the
existence of multiple cooperation channels, or seeking to minimise the importance of the considerable achievements
realised in recent years by the two governments towards normalising their relations, the article show that relations
between the two Asian giants remain hamstrung by a series of geostrategic and economic rivalries. Despite fast
growth in trade and in specific areas of economic cooperation, the normalisation of ties between Beijing and New
Delhi does not yet constitute a genuine strategic partnership.
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plane, for instance, one analytical trend (encapsulated in the
expression “Chindia” (8))argues that the complementary
character of the two economies – “workshop of the world”
(China) and “the globe’s back office” (India) – could boost
their technological cooperation and build a strategic partner-
ship, leading to a major overhaul of the regional and global
economic scene. 
This article counsels caution with regard to media hyperbole as
well as misleading conclusions drawn from the similarities of
population size or pace of economic growth of the two coun-
tries. Without ignoring the existence of several channels of
cooperation or seeking to minimise the importance of consid-
erable achievements realised in recent years by the two govern-
ments towards normalising their relations, this article argues
that pragmatism will prevail on both sides of the Himalayas.
The first part of the article shows that the historical baggage of
bilateral relations dominated by suspicion and conflict is far
from being jettisoned, and that a number of problems that led
the two sides to a military conflict still remain despite the
altered regional and global geopolitical context. In the second
part, devoted to economic matters, the article shows that the
potential for strategic cooperation is limited to a few areas,
whereas the economic rivalry between two countries is much
greater and is unlikely to diminish in intensity or in the number
of contentious issues in the coming years.Sus pi cions  a nd ge ost ra te gicr iv a lr ie s  i n  b il at er al  r el a tions
The war that China unleashed on 20 October 1962 — while
the world’s attention was focused on the “Cuban Missile
Crisis ” between the United States and the Soviet Union –
lasted a mere 30 days, (9) but it continues to haunt Beijing-
New Delhi relations nearly half a century later. Quite apart
from the territorial differences over recognising the
McMahon line (10) and the question of which side was
responsible for sparking the war, (11) geopolitical tensions of a
more general nature have persisted since the 1950s, despite
transformations in the regional and international contexts.
Moreover, the alliance between Pakistan and China, and
India’s backing of the Dalai Lama, continue to weigh heav-
ily on Sino-Indian ties.
T h e cl as h o f  two n a tion al is ms  an dr iva lr ies f or  As ian  lead ers h ip
We’ll start with a review of the geopolitical tensions that
dogged Beijing-New Delhi ties in the 1950s: The rivalry –
never officially expressed – between India and China to
head the movement of developing countries seeking to keep
some independence vis à vis the United States and the
Soviet Union contributed greatly to the deterioration in
Beijing-New Delhi relations. Right from 1927, well before
India’s independence, Nehru had in a speech to the All
India Congress Committee (the central decision-making
body of the Congress party) referred to the role of India and
China in fighting imperialism and promoting non-align-
ment. (12) As is widely known, neutrality and peaceful coexis-
tence became the pivot of India’s foreign policy after inde-
pendence. The democratic character of Indian polity and
Nehru’s aura on the international scene helped India project
itself as the natural leader of the non-aligned movement, pro-
voking jealousy and irritation among Beijing’s Communist
leaders. Several analyses of the causes behind the 1962 war
attribute to China the desire to “teach a lesson” to Nehru
and curtail India’s ambitions of becoming a leader of non-
aligned countries, especially in Asia. The question of lead-
ership of the newly decolonising Asian non-aligned countries
was thus already an issue that pitted the two countries
against each other in the 1950s. 
China had not been recognised by the United Nations, and
while the two countries’ internal economic situations allowed
neither to project political influence in Asia, unambiguous
international recognition helped Nehru’s India assume a role
in Asia that China, immersed in its own political turmoil,
was quite incapable of playing. The war China unleashed
consciously shattered Nehru’s foreign policy ambitions for
India. By forcing India to seek US military aid to counter the
Chinese troops amassing in strength along the Assam
plains, (13) China exposed the limits of the non-alignment pol-
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8. The expression has gained currency since early in the current decade. See for example
Jairam Ramesh, Making sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India, New Delhi,
India Research Press, 2005.
9. The demarcation line set in the Simla accord signed in 1914 with Tibet — without
Chinese assent – by British foreign secretary for India, Henry McMahon.
10. See Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, Pantheon Books, 1970, 475 pp, on New Delhi’s
responsibility in the conflict; see also John W. Garver, Why did China go to war with India
in 1962? http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~johnston/garver.pdf.; and James Barnard
Calvin, The China - India Border War (1962), Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
April 1984, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm. 
11. M. J. Akbar, Nehru: The Making of India, New Delhi, Lotus Rodi, 2002, p. 535 ff.
12. Realising the impossibility in both diplomatic and military terms of encroaching too
deeply into Indian territory despite the Indian army’s rout, Mao and Zhou ordered
Chinese troops to halt their offensive and to retreat from some zones conquered during
the conflict. See Neville Maxwell, op. cit.; see also the memoirs of John K. Galbraith, who
was US ambassador in India at the time of the 1962 conflict: Richard Parker, John
Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics, New York, Farrar, Straus, Giroux,
2005, 820 pp.
13. See especially the remarks of Richard B. Russel, Senate armed forces committee chair-
man, in Ramachandra Guha, op. cit., p. 340 ff.
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icy Nehru touted. US military aid was extended on 20
November 1962 as the conflict was ending, and not without
criticism from American political circles, which rebuked
Nehru’s lack of gratitude for America’s food aid and his
refusal to align New Delhi’s position with Washington’s
against Communism. (14) The conflict exposed to the world at
large India’s military and tactical failures in the face of
China’s determination and solidity. Nehru and his defence
minister V. K. Krishna Menon became the butt of bitter and
pointed attacks from the Indian political class, who consid-
ered them guilty of failing to perceive the extent of the
Chinese threat. Nehru emerged from the conflict greatly
weakened on both the foreign and domestic fronts: he had
never believed war was imminent, despite repeated Chinese
aggressions and warnings from Indian intelligence agen-
cies. (15)
This lack of clarity with regard to the Chinese Communist
revolution stands in sharp contrast to the vision of the other
major Indian leader, Vallabhbhai Patel. In a letter addressed
to Nehru on 4 June 1949, i.e. before the birth of the
People’s Republic of China and Tibet’s annexation in 1951,
Patel had stressed the need: 
to strengthen our position in Sikkim as well as in
Tibet. The farther we keep away the Communist
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14. M.J. Akbar’s recent biography of Nehru clearly depicts his ambivalence towards China.
On the one hand Nehru seemed disturbed by the gathering diplomatic and military ten-
sions in the Himalayas from the mid-1950s, but at the same time he believed that China,
as a developing country concerned over its own diplomatic non-aligned independence
and having suffered under colonial powers, would not launch an aggression against
India. Many analysts attribute to then-defence minister V. K. Krishna Menon a portion of
the blame for India’s defeat. But it was, in the final analysis, Nehru who refused until the
end to believe a Chinese attack was imminent. This was to a large extent the reason for
the Indian troops’ lack of preparedness. By the time the last-chance conciliation meet-
ing with Zhou failed in November 1960, it was already too late for the Indian army, which
was ill-prepared in a region that posed logistical challenges due to its difficult access.
Indian military experts warned Nehru nearly 18 months before the start of the conflict
of China’s overwhelming logistic and military superiority thanks to strategic decisions
Beijing had taken since the mid-50s to build major access routes for its military in the
border region. See Akbar, op.cit., p. 533 ff.
15. B. Krishna, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India’s Iron Man, New Delhi, Rupa, 2005, p. 523 ff.
A Chinese soldier and an Indian soldier stand guard at the Chinese side of
the ancient Nathu La border crossing between India and China. When the
two Asian giants opened the 4,500-metre-high (15,000 feet) pass in 2006
to improve ties dogged by a bitter war in 1962 that saw the route closed for
44 years, many on both sides hoped it would boost trade. Two years on,
optimism has given way to despair as the flow of traders has shrunk to a
trickle because of red tape, poor facilities and sub-standard roads in India’s
remote northeastern mountainous state of Sikkim.
© AFP
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forces (China), the better (for India). I anticipate
that, as soon as the Communists have established
themselves in the rest of China, they will try to
destroy its (Tibet) autonomous existence.” 
In another letter to Nehru in November 1950, Patel said: 
The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by
professions of peaceful intentions [...] The final
action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short
of perfidy; [...] The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans
put faith in us [...] and we have been unable to get
them out of the meshes of the Chinese diplomacy or
Chinese malevolence; [...] China is no longer divid-
ed. It is united and strong [...], Chinese ambitions in
this respect not only cover Himalayan slopes on our
side, but also include important parts of Assam [...]
The danger from the north and north-east, therefore,
becomes both communist and imperialist.” (16)
Patel died in 1950 without seeing how prophetic his words
proved to be. But his more pragmatic vision compared to
Nehru’s in matters of foreign policy, and his suspicion of
Communist China (which was shared by a major portion of
the Indian administration against Nehru’s naiveté), did gain
ground in India’s foreign policy following the conflict with
China. The “Chinese betrayal,” India’s military humiliation,
and its impact on the last days of Nehru, who died in May
1964, (17) left an indelible mark on India’s collective memory. 
All this could well have been forgotten if the two countries
had, like France and Germany after World War II, set out
to actively seek the formation of a diplomatic axis in Asia by
reverting to the idea Nehru had sought to promote in the
1950s. But nothing of that sort happened. Despite the grand
declarations during recent exchanges of official visits, most
of the reasons that led the two giant nations to a military
conflict are still present, despite an altered global and region-
al geopolitical context. 
The border conflict (18) continues to poison bilateral relations.
Many a skirmish occurred after the 1962 ceasefire. The two
armies confronted each other twice, in 1967 (in Sikkim) and
in 1984 (in the Sumdorong Chu valley in Arunachal
Pradesh state). In 1987, the tone rose again in both capitals,
sparking fears of another conflict. It was only in 1993 that
New Delhi and Beijing signed an agreement on preserving
“peace and tranquillity” along the line of control. Despite
setting up a working group in November 2006 to resolve the
border conflict, negotiations have yet to yield concrete
results, and the occurrence of many recent incidents along
the line of control shows that a resolution of the border issue
is still far away. Indian leaders in Arunachal Pradesh state
have on many occasions conveyed to New Delhi their fears
over the reinforcement of Chinese military forces since
2005. Indian authorities have officially complained of hun-
dreds of incursions by Chinese troops across the line of con-
trol since 2006. (19) Nearly 65 incursions by the Chinese
forces have been recorded since the start of 2008 in Sikkim,
even though Beijing ostensibly acknowledged New Delhi’s
sovereignty over the region following a visit to China in 2003
by India’s prime minister at the time, Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
New Chinese demands over Sikkim could serve as a means
to gain the upper hand in negotiations with India over anoth-
er disputed region, that of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.
Apart from possessing major mineral resources and being sit-
uated in the strategic Tibetan border, Tawang is a noted cen-
tre of Tibetan Buddhism. The Galden Namgey Lhatse
monastery, where the 6th Dalai Lama was born, is the sec-
ond largest in Tibetan Buddhism after the Potala in Lhasa,
and members of the Tibetan government in exile made it an
important base after their escape from Chinese control. It is
therefore understandable that the Chinese communist lead-
ership wants to recoup the territory (the Tibetan issue is fur-
ther discussed below).
On the Indian side, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visit-
ed Arunachal Pradesh just after his official trip to Beijing in
January 2008. It was the first prime ministerial visit to the
state in ten years. He sought to reassure local leaders — and
demonstrate to Indian nationalists —- that he would not aban-
don any part of Indian territory in negotiations with China
to settle the border dispute. He also promised that he would
release nearly two billion dollars towards infrastructure devel-
opment in the border region, close to the line of control.
This drew immediate protests from Beijing. (20) On 31 May
2008, India also opened the Ladakh’s Daulat Beg Oldi air
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16. See Nehru’s statement in Parliament on 8 November 1962, in which he strongly
deplored what he saw as China’s betrayal. It also amounted to an acknowledgement on
his part of a major blunder in his foreign policy as it concerned China (Nehru was his
own foreign minister). See Guha, op. cit., p. 334. Galbraith, the US ambassador,
described in his memoirs Nehru’s state of physical and mental shock in the immediate
aftermath of the ceasefire in November 1962. See Parker, op. cit., p. 400 ff.
17. Chinese versions of the territorial conflict and of the 1962 war are thin on the ground.
For instance, China has not revealed the number of casualties in its ranks.
18. The Indian government protested some 140 intrusions beyond the LoC by the Chinese
army in 2007. Times of India, 6 April 2008.
19. Thomson, op.cit.
20. Sudha Ramachandran, “India takes the high ground against China,” Asia Times, inter-
net edition, 14 June 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF14Df02.html.
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field, which had been closed for 43 years. The facility, situ-
ated close to the line of control at an altitude of more than
4,000 metres on the Aksai Chin plateau, and not far from
the Karakoram highway linking Pakistan and China, is
expected to help reinforce major Indian military logistics in
the strategic zone. Beijing was quick to make known its dis-
pleasure over the move. The reopening of the Daulat Beg
Oldi air strip is seen by Indian analysts as a response to sev-
eral Chinese incursions across the line of control since 2005
that had gone unanswered by India. It also showed a willing-
ness to boost India’s military presence in the entire strategic
region. (21)
It is worth noting that the border issue has become a kind of
barometer of bilateral ties. Despite the thaw in relations,
New Delhi and Beijing are still blowing hot and cold over
the settlement of the border dispute, a function of evolution
in the most important bilateral issues. The Indo-US rap-
prochement, especially on the civilian nuclear issue (see
below), has led to a series of statements on China’s part
with regard to the border dispute. The most astounding –
though it merely reiterated a known Chinese stand – was
that of the then Chinese ambassador Sun Yuxi, shortly after
President Hu Jintao’s India trip. The envoy said in
November 2006 in a televised interview that Arunachal
Pradesh belonged to China, drawing a predictably furious
response from India. (22) On the Chinese side the border dis-
pute is largely a geostrategic security issue of little concern
to the public in comparison with attitudes toward Japan and
Taiwan; on the Indian side, however, the 1962 humiliation
left a great deal of nationalism and emotion invested. Failing
a strong Chinese gesture, the Indian side will have only lim-
ited elbow room in negotiations. 
As for rivalry over Asian leadership, economic and diplomat-
ic clout has turned the wheel largely in Beijing’s favour.
China has a permanent seat in the UN Security Council,
and its rapid economic development has led to active diplo-
macy with Asian countries since the mid-1990s. A recent
article by Tarique Niazi points out that China has built a net-
work of control over the Indian sphere of influence in Asia
through its tentacles in ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO), and the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation, (23) and also through its highly active
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21. For an analysis of the political repercussions in India from this statement, see The
Hindu, 24 November 2006.
22. In which China has won observer status.
23. Tarique Niazi, “Sino–Indian Rivalry for Pan-Asian Leadership,” China Brief, Vol. 6, n° 4,
15 February 2006.
Disputed area between China and India after the 1962 war
© CEFC
Emergence of a Pragmatic India-China Relationship
bilateral engagement with India’s neighbours, including
Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and of course Pakistan. (24)
Moreover, China has developed naval cooperation with
many Asian countries to form a “pearl necklace” (in the
Chinese media’s words) in South and Southeast Asia
through the establishment of a series of permanent military
bases to secure energy supplies. (25) Some of these bases,
such as those in Chittagong in Bangladesh, Coco Islands in
Myanmar, Habantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in the Maldives,
and Gwadar in Pakistan, are very much in India’s maritime
“zone of influence.” 
Faced with all these actions on China’s part, India has
responded by obtaining dialogue partner status with
ASEAN and observer status in the SCO, and launching
some regional initiatives such as the “Mekong Ganga
Cooperation” (26) in Nov 2000. Despite this Indian counter-
offensive, China clearly dominates the diplomatic game of
spheres of influence. India hasn’t renounced its ambitions for
Asian leadership, however. Nearly a half century after
Nehru’s death, and in an Asia transformed in the economic
and political spheres, India continues, rightly or wrongly, to
believe that its demographic weight, democratic values, and
more recent economic dynamism could help it play a major
role on the Asian stage. This hasn’t gone unnoticed in
Beijing, and the Sino-Indian rivalry in Asia continues to fuel
mutual suspicion comparable to that between France and
Prussia in Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth centu-
ry. For now, Beijing enjoys a clear advantage. 
The last issue that is symptomatic of this geostrategic rivalry
concerns India’s aspirations for a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council. Beijing has blown hot and cold over the
issue, never officially setting out a clear position. On 30
May 2008, during a BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China)
summit at Yekaterinburg in Russia, China refused to sign a
Russian-drafted final communiqué backing India’s candida-
ture. This refusal has been interpreted to mean either a
change in China’s position or its pursuit of a policy of con-
trol over the Indian sphere of influence. The handling of an
issue so dear to India shows a deep chasm in the way of
bilateral strategic cooperation.
F ear s  of  c on tai nmen t an d “ mén age   à  tro is ” wi th t he  Un ited  Sta tes
Among the geopolitical tensions that bedevilled the two
countries during the 1950s, China’s fear of being encircled
through India’s strategic military alliance with the United
States and the Soviet Union contributed greatly to the dete-
rioration of bilateral ties. During the 1950s, Nehru succeed-
ed in adroitly maintaining close relations with both sides of
the Cold War (in spite of nettlesome relations with
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a fervent anti-commu-
nist and initiator of the pact with Pakistan in February
1954). (27) In 1959, Khrushchev openly criticised China’s
stands over Taiwan, Tibet, and the Sino-Indian border, and
in July 1960, he recalled thousands of Soviet experts work-
ing in China. This rupture with the Soviet Union put China
in a state of total isolation. The double alliance India was
pursuing with the United States and the Soviet Union wor-
ried Chinese leaders, who feared being totally surrounded
and forced to guard a new hostile front along the Himalayas
in addition to the long border with the Soviet Union and
that with Korea and the maritime borders with Taiwan and
Japan. China was also worried about anti-Chinese agitation
in Tibet. The Dalai Lama’s departure from Lhasa in March
1959 and the welcome he received from the Indian govern-
ment reinforced Chinese fears of possible military destabili-
sation in Tibet. 
In going to war with India on 10 October 1962, China’s aim
was to neutralise with minimum force the dangers weighing
on the vast frontier region in the south-west of the country
so as to preserve sufficient military means to face up to US
threats (over Taiwan) as well as Soviet ones. The United
States eventually decided on 20 November 1962 to extend
military backing to India. (28) China, which had been aware
for some days that it had achieved its aims and couldn’t sus-
tain a more ambitious invasion into Indian territory, declared
a unilateral ceasefire (29) and retreated from a good part of the
territory conquered during the month-long war. The mission
to militarily secure its south-west border had been realised.
The Sino-Pakistan alliance, which had strengthened since
1963, helped Beijing complete the process in the south-west. 
Nehru’s death in 1964, and the drift under his daughter,
Indira Gandhi, towards populist socialism internally as well
towards the Soviet Union externally, gradually distanced
India from the United States. The elevation of Indo-Soviet
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24. Olivier Zajec, “La Chine affirme ses ambitions navales” (China asserts its naval ambi-
tions), Le Monde Diplomatique, September 2008, n°654, pp. 18-19.
25. With six member countries – Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam –
to promote regional cooperation in education, tourism, transport and culture.
26. Guha, op. cit., p. 159.
27. Faced with the massing of Chinese troops threatening the Assam plains, Nehru resigned
himself to requesting US military assistance, which sparked much controversy within
India as well as in the United States.
28. The ceasefire was declared a day before the official announcement of US assistance.
Calvin, op. cit.
29. It was the subject of a bilateral agreement signed in August 2007.
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ties to a higher level from the mid-1960s continued to fuel
Chinese fears of encirclement. Only in the 1980s and
1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet regime – a period of
relative isolation for India – did China being to feel at ease. 
President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in 2000, coming 22
years after Jimmy Carter’s in 1978, revived containment
fears in the Chinese leadership, which believed the United
States was seeking to choke off China’s emerging economic
might through alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the
countries of Central and Southern Asia. These fears deep-
ened when a proposal for a nuclear accord was unveiled dur-
ing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s official US trip in
July 2005. The proposal envisaged (30) India (a non-signato-
ry to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — NPT) allow-
ing inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) access to its nuclear energy production sites, (31)
along with a moratorium on nuclear tests. In exchange, India
would gain access to US nuclear technology, ending 34
years of embargo on trade in nuclear material following
India’s first test in 1974. (32) More generally, the agreement
would allow India to officially enter the select group of
nuclear powers while remaining outside of the NPT. The
accord with the US required approval by the Indian
Parliament, followed by the IAEA, the 45-nation nuclear
suppliers group, and finally US Congress.
The first hurdle in the process affecting Indo-US ties was
crossed with some difficulty. After a nine-month delay in
schedule, and a bitter debate, India’s ruling Congress party
secured parliamentary assent on 22 July 2008, (33) thanks to
backing from some small parties and independents and the
abstention of some opposition MPs. This result came about
despite the defection of the Communists (mainly members
the Communist Party of India-Marxist), who had been back-
ing the government from the outside. The delay fuelled crit-
icism in the United States of India’s inability to keep its word
and the reluctance of its political class to seek a genuine rap-
prochement with Washington. Nevertheless, many observers
insisted that the difficulties faced in the process of getting
the deal approved by Indian MPs would temper the zeal of
2005, and it would be possible to envisage a more realistic
and pragmatic Indo-US relationship. (34) More generally and
beyond the nuclear issue, there have been extensive ideolog-
ical departures in both the United States and India over the
last few years on the question of bilateral ties. Washington
has decided to pay serious attention to New Delhi’s politi-
cal, military, and economic weight in the region and to inte-
grate it in strategic action plans for Asian security. (35) On the
Indian side, both the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the
Congress have worked for rapprochement with the United
States since early this decade. (36) This change has been
reflected in a clear increase in bilateral cooperation in the
strategic, military (joint exercises in the Indian Ocean), and
economic domains. 
While on the Chinese side the effort is to limit the effects
of strategic and military encirclement, on the Indian side the
rapprochement with the United States is aimed at directly
limiting Chinese influence in Asia. One analyst of India’s
foreign policy put it this way: 
More than the sops offered by the United States, it is
the stick being wielded by China that is powering the
current Indian sprint toward a substantive strategic
partnership with the United States, one that can only
affect China’s interests in Asia negatively. The
Himalayan chill now enveloping Sino-Indian (37) ties is
creating summer warmth in India’s relations with the
other superpower, the United States. (38)
This profound and lasting change in Indo-US ties has not
escaped the attention of Beijing, which first fiercely attacked
the nuclear accord, (39) then sought to counter the American
“charm offensive” in India by dangling the possibility of sig-
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“India sceptics” in Washington. Among the many criticisms already aired following the
Indo-US accord were those insisting that New Delhi would make no change whatsoev-
er to its non-alignment policy. It would appear that the Indo-US nuclear accord would
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on Foreign Relations, February 2008.
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nificant civilian nuclear cooperation. (40) The announcement
of this proposal in November 2006 has yet to be followed up
by any tangible move on Beijing’s part. Although many in
the Chinese military were hesitant about the gesture, Beijing
may have hoped that the announcement of a potential coop-
eration would boost the numbers of Indian MPs opposed to
the Indo-US nuclear agreement. China was also aware that
the mere announcement of such a proposal could ignite
“India sceptics” in Washington. (41) Since the US-India
agreement was signed in 2005, many in Washington have
questioned the usefulness of US attempts to forge a strategic
partnership with a country that does not wish to make the
slightest changes to its policy of non-alignment, and which
would remain, as during the Nehru and Indira Gandhi years,
insensitive to US strategic initiatives. The 22 July 2008 vote
in the Indian parliament backing the nuclear accord with the
United States appears to have calmed the waters in
Washington and frustrated Beijing’s attempts to destabilise
the Congress party by stoking a defection of its Communist
allies. 
The next three hurdles were crossed without great ado: The
IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rapidly
gave their green lights after the Indian parliament vote, and
the agreement gained the approval of the US Congress on
1 October 2008. 
Beijing will henceforth be in a more uncomfortable position
in countering the strategic repercussions of the Indo-US rap-
prochement. All the same, Beijing could decide to cooperate
earnestly with India so that the United States does not
become India’s only and privileged partner in nuclear issues.
Engaging in nuclear cooperation with India would also help
Beijing test New Delhi’s non-aligned credentials. And being
“courted” by both Washington and Beijing on the issue, New
Delhi might be tempted to play them off each other for high-
er stakes. However, keeping equidistant ties with Washington
and Beijing and pursuing non-alignment would be a difficult
balancing act for New Delhi. The United States would need
some proof and gestures of exclusive loyalty from India in
order to subdue Washington sceptics. Any perception in
Washington that New Delhi was trying to play the big pow-
ers against each other could recoil and discredit India (as in
the past) in its role of new Asian strategic partner. 
This “ménage à trois,” which is clearly transforming strategic
relations in Asia in a deep and abiding way, could have sur-
prises in store. Beijing holds many advantages – close ties
with Pakistan, weight in the UN, special relations with
ASEAN, and economic might in the region – to counter
India’s influence. But as the nuclear issue has clearly shown,
after a 30-year hiatus, China’s fears of containment through
warming Indo-US ties could again become a crucial factor in
Sino-Indian ties. This development can only exacerbate feel-
ings of suspicion and pragmatism on both sides.
T h e Tib et  is su e
The Dalai Lama had considered requesting political asylum
as early as 1956, when he was part of the official Chinese
delegation during Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to India. Sino-
Indian relations were then in fine fettle. In an agreement
signed with China in April 1954, India had officially recog-
nised that Tibet belonged to China, and Nehru had sig-
nalled to the Dalai Lama that he did not wish to interfere
in Sino-Tibetan affairs for fear of annoying the Chinese
government. But by the time the Dalai Lama crossed the
border in March 1959 and sought refuge in India, Sino-
Indian ties had already begun unravelling. China’s construc-
tion in 1957 of roads for transporting military supplies to its
borders with India, the publication of maps in 1958 claim-
ing a part of Ladakh as Chinese territory, the exchange of
letters between Nehru and Zhou in which the Chinese
leader said in 1958 that Beijing did not recognise the
McMahon line, and the first skirmishes along the border,
had already led to deterioration of relations. The revolt by
the Khampas in late 1958 was ruthlessly put down by the
Chinese army, further convincing the Dalai Lama that his
situation in Lhasa had become precarious. In this context of
hostility with China, the Indian government this time
accepted the Dalai Lama’s request. His arrival in India in
late March 1959 further vitiated Sino-Indian ties. In an
interview with the American journalist Edgar Snow in
October 1960, Zhou Enlai said the boundary dispute
“came to the fore” after “the Dalai Lama had run away.”
He accused India of wanting to “turn China’s Tibet region
into a ‘buffer zone.’” He said: “They don’t want Tibet to
become a Socialist Tibet, as had other places in China,”
and that “the Indian side ... is using the Sino-Indian bound-
ary question as a card against progressive forces at home
and as capital for obtaining ‘foreign aid.’” (42)
Nearly a half century after the Dalai Lama’s arrival in
India, the Tibet issue continues to bedevil bilateral ties.
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The Sino-Indian modus operandi over Tibet remains frag-
ile. Although the Indian authorities periodically pull up the
Dalai Lama when he uses his Dharamsala headquarters for
political activities to which China objects, he enjoys free
movement in and out of India and manages to irritate the
Chinese on a regular basis. (43) The major uprising in March
2008 by the Tibetan population again upset whatever under-
standing existed between China and India on the Tibet
issue. (44) Despite the arrest of some Tibetans for staging
“anti-China” activities on Indian soil, (45) the Indian authori-
ties have allowed demonstrations in many major cities, and
the foreign ministry shed its reticence for once in calling for
negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese
authorities and a non-violent resolution of the troubles in
Tibet. (46)
Yet another matter of Sino-Indian dispute and one linked to
Tibet and the border issue is Beijing’s claim to the whole
of Arunachal Pradesh state in north-eastern India. China
argues that the state was part of Tibet before the signing of
the McMahon treaty in 1914. Tibet having become
Chinese territory, Beijing believed Arunachal Pradesh
belonged to it by right, insisting that Tibet had signed the
McMahon treaty under British military pressure. From the
late 1950s, Beijing claimed that the treaty stemmed from
colonialism, was worthless, and that India, which had suf-
fered under British domination, ought not to recognise it.
During the Sino-Tibetan talks in July 2007, the Arunachal
Pradesh issue was on the agenda for the first time. China
voiced firm opposition to the decision taken by the Tibetan
government in exile in December 2006 to accept India’s
sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing’s accusation
that the Tibetan government in exile had succumbed to
pressure from Indian leaders, public opinion, and media
was rejected in both Dharamsala and New Delhi. The
Arunachal issue is another that complicates the settlement
of Sino-Indian disputes.
Th e S in o-P akis tan  al l ian c e
Pakistan was the first Muslim country and the third non-
communist one to recognise the People’s Republic of China
in January 1950. As Indian academic Swaran Singh has
pointed out, contrary to an oft-expressed view, China and
Pakistan had embarked on a strategic partnership well
before the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the mutual defence
agreement between Pakistan and United States signed in
1954. (47) Starting in 1960, while the United States supplied
military aid to Pakistan and backed the Chinese Nationalists
in Taiwan, the Pakistanis supported the People’s Republic
in its rivalry with Taiwan to occupy a permanent seat in the
UN Security Council. The Sino-Indian war certainly
strengthened China’s cooperation with Pakistan. They
signed an agreement in 1963 on the border issue, and China
backed Pakistan during its 1965 war with India by issuing
warnings to New Delhi, and again after East Pakistan
declared independence in 1971 with Indian military help, by
using its newly won UN Security Council veto in 1972 to
block Bangladesh’s UN membership. China and Pakistan
had been strengthening their military ties from the mid-
1960s, especially in nuclear matters. Following India’s
nuclear test in 1974, China was the main external backer of
Pakistan’s military nuclear programme, with the tacit under-
standing of the United States and indirect aid from
European countries such as West Germany. (48) Although the
amount of China’s military aid to Pakistan is quite difficult
to estimate, given the secrecy that surrounds it, Western
sources believe it to be among the most comprehensive and
substantial that the People’s Republic has supplied to any
country since 1949. (49) Pakistan, for its part, used its influ-
ence with the United States throughout the 1960s to get the
China seat in the UN vacated by Taiwan and turned over to
Communist China. Pakistan also played a major role in
Sino-US rapprochement by facilitating Kissinger’s secret trip
to Beijing in July 1971, and Nixon’s state visit in February
1972. 
The warming of Sino-Indian diplomatic relations since the
early 1990s has not dented Beijing-Islamabad ties. If any-
thing, an economic facet has been added to their strong
military and strategic ties since the early 1990s. Notable
was the launch in 2002 of development of the deep-water
port at Gwadar, close to the Strait of Hormuz, through
which nearly 20 percent of global oil moves. The construc-
tion the Gwadar port, which is now close to completion,
has been 80 percent funded by China (a total of $250 mil-
lion) and overseen mainly by state-owned China Harbour
Engineering Co. Ltd., with nearly 350 Chinese engineers
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engaged in the project. (50) In 2007, the Pakistani govern-
ment entrusted operation of the port to the PSA Group of
Singapore for 25 years, and conferred duty free status to
Gwadar for 40 years. Although the management agree-
ment does not give Chinese ships exclusive rights to the
use of Gwadar port, given its assistance in the construc-
tion and the solidity of Sino-Pakistan cooperation, China
can anticipate good use of the strategic site to protect its
energy supplies and boost its military presence. The proj-
ect, emblematic of the strengthening of naval cooperation
between Pakistan and China, has serious strategic and
military implications for India, according to W. Lawrence
S. Prabhakar. India will face a more muscular Chinese
naval presence and the boosting of Beijing’s efforts to sti-
fle New Delhi’s influence in the Indian Ocean region. (51)
More generally, although Sino-Pakistani relations have
had to gradually adapt to the thaw in Sino-Indian ties, (52)
Pakistan remains a highly strategic card in China’s foreign
policy “game” in the region. A realignment with India or
even a balancing act favouring New Delhi appears highly
unlikely. Beijing may well deny it, but the fact remains that
Pakistan remains a cat’s paw limiting India’s moves on the
regional chessboard: the links between Pakistan’s intelli-
gence agencies and Islamic militants impeding a resolution
of the Kashmir dispute (among other problems), military
rivalry with India, communal conflicts between Hindus
and Muslims that poisons Indian polity, the paralysis in
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
caused by the Indo-Pakistan rivalry, and the access China
has gained to Pakistan through the Strait of Hormuz, all
constitute destabilising factors for India and will restrain
its influence in the region. Moreover, China also enjoys a
privileged entry into the Muslim world via Pakistan.
Finally, the Indo-Pakistan rivalry allows China to keep its
military presence relatively limited on its south-west flank.
Despite the transformations in its relations with the
United States and Russia, China must still ensure the
security of its 22,722 kilometres of borders (the world’s
longest border, even exceeding Russia’s) with 14 coun-
tries, including the 4,057 kilometre boundary with India
(China’s third longest after those with Mongolia and
Russia). Moreover, China’s Taiwan policy and the US
military presence in Japan and South Korea preclude the
concentration of too much military might in one border
area. 
For all these reasons, Sino-Pakistan relations can be expect-
ed to take precedence over Sino-Indian ties. As for New
Delhi, although more and more voices call for a reasonable
and rational view of Sino-Pakistan ties, (53) the fact remains
that the relationship is largely seen as a strategic alliance
shrouded in secrecy and mainly aimed against India.B eyo nd co mp le m ent ar it i es  i ne co nom ic re la tio ns
A  win dow -dr ess in g p ac t  between  th e“ wo rld ’s  wor ksh op ” a nd  the  “ wor ld ’s b ac ko ffi ce”
Among the analyses touting the potential for strategic eco-
nomic cooperation between China and India, the alliance
between the “world’s back office” (India) and the “world’s
workshop” (China) is certainly one that has captured the
imagination of many people. During a visit to India’s
“Silicon Valley,” Bangalore, in April 2005, Premier Wen
Jiabao went so far as to compare cooperation to “two pago-
das, one hardware and one software; combined, we can take
the leadership position in the world. When the particular
day comes, it will signify the coming of the Asian century of
the IT industry.” (54)
Nevertheless the question arises as to how this specialisation
in two different segments of the information industry, and
more generally between two economic sectors (manufactur-
ing in China and services in India, see Graphic 1), could
induce greater bilateral cooperation. Few factors favour a
deeper industrial cooperation between the two sides beyond
superficial complementarities. 
Firstly, cooperation would require each side to renounce
over the long term the development on its soil of the seg-
ment in which it holds the lesser advantage, both absolute
and comparative (in the sense David Ricardo meant). The
current industrial policies of the two governments, as well
the decisions of companies in each country, show a trend in
exactly the opposite direction. Over the past few years, the
two sides have, with varying degrees of success, striven to
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correct the economic development trajectories that led to an
atrophy of industry in India’s case and comparatively slower
growth in services in China. (see Graphic 1). Taking the
information industry as an example, it is clear that neither
country has (as yet) given up developing on its soil the seg-
ments it currently lacks. 
Aware of a backlog in the services sector, Chinese authorities
at all levels have since the start of this decade boosted efforts
to develop information technology- and biotechnology-based
industries. Special Economic Zones such as Shenzhen and
high technology development zones such as Zhongguancun
(in Beijing) or Pudong (in Shanghai), to mention only a few,
have made great strides in training, R&D infrastructure, and
intellectual property protection in order to promote the growth
of these types of services. (55)
Similarly, India has taken measures to narrow the gap in the
industrial domain. Indian companies have made increasing
incursions into industrial sectors in which China enjoys a clear
advantage in terms of economies of scale, export volume, and
mastery of mass production techniques. (56) This is the case in
sectors such as automobiles, textiles (which in fact have suf-
fered less from competition with China than initially feared
with the termination of export quotas to developed countries
in 2005), (57) heavy industry (chemicals and steel), and more
recently in the production of hardware for the information
industry. These incursions have benefited from policies to pro-
tect India’s domestic industry more in the home market than
in exports. In terms of exports, especially textiles, Indian pro-
ducers have found some niche markets in which they avoid
direct competition with Chinese exports. (58) Many projections
also indicate that should the Indian government pursue a tar-
geted liberalisation of foreign trade (reduction of import duties
on intermediate products used in export production and low-
ering of transport costs), Indian industry could repeat the
experience of China during the 1990s in benefiting from inte-
gration into the international division of labour through open-
ness to more foreign direct investment and quickly develop a
position of strength in manufacturing manpower. This would
be all the more likely if India were to reform its labour laws
(which currently restrict unskilled labour movement in the
organised sector). Given India’s demography – up until 2050
it will have an expanding active population younger than
China’s – the country will be in increasingly direct competi-
tion with China in manufacturing. (59)
Without waiting to realise these projections in the medium
to long term, the Indian government has shown through its
inaction on a Chinese proposal for a free trade agreement
(FTA) that it has no desire to abandon those sectors in
which China excels. First proposed by China in 2004, and
broached every time Chinese leaders visited India, the FTA
suggestion was rejected by both the BJP and Congress
when in power. (60) A protectionist dimension is certainly evi-
dent in this refusal, notably pressure from the Indian busi-
ness lobby (such as the Confederation of Indian Industry)
against the agreement, but it also shows the government’s
desire to protect its industry from Chinese manufacturers
and develop on the strength of the immense domestic mar-
ket. India certainly needs to reform several elements of its
trade and investment regimes. In fact, it has to find an appro-
priate balance, as China has done, between a “developmen-
talist” desire and the need to open itself to foreign presence
and thus better integrate with the global economy. 
More generally, China’s domestic market is as large as
India’s. Unlike countries with small populations that need to
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
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specialise, vast domestic markets favour the development of
the broadest range of industries and services with help from
foreign direct investment. A country’s comparative advan-
tage and competitiveness in particular industrial sectors are
not fixed in time; they can change and improve gradually
over the years behind an evolving and selective protectionist
wall. Like France, Germany, and the United States in the
nineteenth century, (61) or Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, this
was the policy China followed in the 1980s and 1990s
before agreeing to significantly reduce tariffs in order to gain
entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001.
At the same time, China continues to maintain non-tariff
barriers, to the chagrin of industrialised countries, in order
to nurture a wide range of industries and services on its soil.
A recent study showed that in India, too, many industrial
sectors have gained a considerable international comparative
advantage in the space of a few years. (62) It should be stated
here that if the day dawns when China and India dominate
manufacturing or services, it will almost certainly take place
in the context of competition, and not in the framework of a
complementary partnership.
Secondly, even if current complementarities in economic
activities (or trade) persist, they will not necessarily lead to
closer industrial or technological cooperation between the
two countries. The example of Japan and China shows this
quite clearly. Despite rapid increases in trade – Japan is
China’s second largest trade partner after the EU – and the
existence of complementarities in economic activities, the
two countries have nevertheless failed to develop a strategic
partnership in the technological or industrial sectors. Indeed,
such partnerships are an exception rather than a rule in con-
temporary international economic relations generally.
Technological and industrial cooperation among the EU
countries was preceded and accompanied by a process of
political integration that is unique in economic history today.
It is also worth mentioning the great access enjoyed by
Japanese and then Korean and Taiwanese firms to US tech-
nology following World War II. This cooperation was large-
ly motivated by geopolitical considerations linked to the
defence of American interests and the development of a
“capitalist  front” during the Cold War. (63) These countries
were also within the US military’s sphere of influence in the
post-war period, which helped facilitate such cooperation
until the 1970s. Once the Cold War ended, the United
States demanded greater access for its products to the
domestic markets of these countries, and the dismantling of
non-competitive practices (including the links among indus-
trial groups and banks such as the Keireitsu in Japan and the
Korean Chaebols), while imposing much stricter controls,
even restrictions, on the transfer of technologies to compa-
nies in these countries. (64)
China-India ties fit neither the political integration model
nor that of military protection or domination. It is therefore
highly likely that current complementarities in economic
structures will not lead to closer technological and industrial
cooperation, but rather to more ”conventional” progress in
trade and investment exchanges, which in itself would be a
great improvement over the past. 
Thus the presence of firms such as China’s Huawei in
Bangalore or Tata Consulting in Pudong (65) must be viewed
with prudence and sobriety. China has become a formidable
market globally. The growth in demand for information tech-
nology services on the part of Chinese firms as well as multi-
nationals installed in China is such that it would be suicidal
for Indian companies that lead in this domain not to boost
their presence in China, all the more so as a number of
multinationals that have been long-term clients of Indian
firms have gained a major presence in China and continue
to require servicing by Indian companies in the framework of
traditional software sub-contracting. 
In India, Chinese companies have sought to increase their
presence since early this decade as part of a process of rapid
multi-nationalisation. This is as imperative for them as it is
for their Indian, Western, or Japanese counterparts. They
have to strengthen and diversify their acquisition of techno-
logical competence or risk losing out not only to global com-
petition but also within a domestic market that has opened
under WTO membership. The firms have to “source” their
technologies in the major world centres. As Bangalore and
Hyderabad have emerged as two such centres, it would be
normal for Chinese firms to establish bases there and seek
out cooperation with leading Indian companies specialising
in information technologies. The Wipro-Huawei joint ven-
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ture that began in 2002 in the field of telecom routers is no
different from the numerous commercial tie-ups between
Indian firms and those from the United States, Europe, or
Japan based in Bangalore or Hyderabad. The fact of it
being a Sino-Indian JV is noteworthy as a “first” following a
long freeze in the political and economic ties between New
Delhi and Beijing. But in no way does it signal the develop-
ment of closer bilateral strategic technological and industrial
cooperation as some analysts suggest. (66)
Cu rr ent  comp lement ar it ies  an d fu tu r eco mpetit i on  in  tra de  re l atio ns  
As Table 2 shows, bilateral trade, which was almost non-
existent until the 1990s ($260 million in 1991), has grown
rapidly since early this decade. The targets set by the two
countries in 2005 of achieving $20 billion worth of trade by
2008, and $30 billion by 2010, appears to have been sur-
passed: bilateral trade was already worth nearly $39 billion
in 2007. (67)
Research by M.S. Qureshi and Wan Guanghua (68) into the
foreign trade structures of both countries shows that the
rapid rise in bilateral exchanges can be explained by increas-
ing complementarities between India and China in recent
years. To summarize, India mainly exports raw materials to
China, which for its part ships mostly manufactured goods to
India. Rapid economic growth in both countries, and the
“reserves of complementarities” in products traded, increase
the likelihood of rapid bilateral exchanges in the years to
come, the authors say. India, for instance, has strong poten-
tial for increasing exports of leather and inorganic chemicals
to China. (69) At the same time, China is capable of boosting
its exports of telecommunication products and computers to
India. Similarly, there is potential for intersectoral growth in
steel, organic, and inorganic chemicals, as well as machin-
ery. (70) With a growth rate of 50 percent since 2000, bilater-
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al trade could total $60 billion by the end of this decade,
and $100 billion by 2015. (71)
There are, nevertheless, many potential roadblocks to this
expansion in bilateral trade, some of which could ignite trade
disputes. The first is linked to the nature of Indian exports
to China, mostly agricultural raw materials and minerals.
Supplies of these natural resources are not unlimited, and
given its domestic needs, India could be forced to limit the
export of some products to China. This already occurred in
July 2008 when Chinese importers, who had greatly boost-
ed their imports of Indian iron ore, were faced with a new
15 percent tax on export of the raw material, which the gov-
ernment in New Delhi imposed in order to ensure adequate
supplies to domestic steelworks. It would not be surprising if
such protectionist measures multiply in India, given the enor-
mous demand for mineral resources in China and the corre-
sponding exponential demand from India’s own industry.
The second limit is linked to the imbalance in trade that
favours China, portending disputes. After having registered
balanced trade and even a favourable turn between 2003
and 2005, India’s deficit vis à vis China has risen rapidly
since 2006; it was$ 9.39 billion in 2007 (see Table 2), or
11 percent of India’s total trade deficit. (72) With a nearly 9.4
percent share of India’s total imports by late 2007, China
could well end up as India’s top trade partner, overtaking the
United States, if the trend in the first few months of 2008
holds. Despite a rapid rise in exports to China, India
accounts for a mere 1.3 percent of China’s total imports.
Projections by foreign trade experts on the effects of a Sino-
Indian FTA show that China would benefit more. A 2007
study by the Institute for Economic Research in Munich
showed that an FTA with a 100 percent reduction in tariffs
would result in China’s exports (with 2004 as base year) ris-
ing by 131 percent, against a mere 38 percent in India’s
case. (73) This projection (on a static model without account-
ing for comparative advantages) and many other sectoral
studies show that without a major improvement in the com-
petitiveness of Indian goods, any simultaneous and propor-
tional reduction in tariffs by Beijing and New Delhi would
lead to a far higher increase in exports from China to India
than in the other direction. (74) It is therefore understandable
that the Indian business lobby favours the status quo and the
Indian government has dragged its feet on an FTA with
China. As part of an FTA, if India’s trade imbalance with
China worsened, sections of Indian industry could suffer a
serious competitive disadvantage, given the proportion of
manufactured goods among China’s exports to India. At a
time when India is trying to play catch-up in industry, com-
petition from China, which already poses problems for some
sectors at current tariff levels, (75) could further threaten take-
off plans should an FTA be implemented. It is thus not sur-
prising that India has joined a number of other countries in
refusing to grant market economy status to China in the
WTO framework. By doing so, India is able to take steps to
protect its market when it believes Chinese producers are
“dumping” goods through prices depressed by their socialist
heritage and disregard for laws such as those governing min-
imum wage and environmental protection.
In short, the rapid rise in exchanges is an encouraging and
positive sign of warming Sino-Indian relations. It also ends
the aberrant situation of what until early in this decade was
a ridiculously tiny trade volume, given the rate of economic
growth in the two countries, their physical proximity and the
structural complementarities of their economies. However,
as the example of Sino-Japanese ties shows, growing trade
exchanges do not equate to strategic economic cooperation.
Moreover, the sharp rise in trade could potentially bring an
imbalance for India that could lead to disputes with China.
Therefore India is most likely to continue protecting its
industry and raw materials vis à vis China, which for its part
is unlikely to be content with its current strong position in
trade, but will keep pushing for an opening of India’s domes-
tic market to its goods. Tensions and conflicts are thus likely
to accompany soaring bilateral trade.P a ra ll el  a nd co mp e tit i ve  ques tsfo r  new  s ourc es  of  ra w  m at er ia l
In January 2006, when Mani Shankar Aiyar, then minister
for petroleum and natural gas, signed an agreement during
an official trip to China, many analysts and commentators
enthusiastically endorsed an energy alliance between the
two sides. (76) The agreement envisages extensive cooperation
in the fields of oil and gas prospecting, refining, and distri-
bution, and promotion of alternative energy. Above all, the
two countries wished to express their willingness to eschew
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cutthroat competition in the search for energy in all corners
of the globe in order to meet their soaring demand for ener-
gy supplies. Just before the agreement was signed, in
November 2005, India’s ONGC (Oil & Natural Gas
Corporation) and its counterpart, CNPC (China National
Petroleum Corporation) got together for the first time ever
to buy a major stake in Petro-Canada’s venture in the Syria’s
al-Furat oilfields. (77) The January 2006 tie-up gave a genuine
boost to Sino-Indian energy cooperation. Many other large-
scale joint operations have since been launched, such as
those in Sudan (78) and Colombia, (79) and more recently in
the supply of equipment for electricity generation. (80) The
idea of two economic giants and new entrants on the inter-
national energy chessboard getting together to take on major
US, European, and Japanese companies on their favourite
hunting grounds of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America,
and Central Asia, was no doubt a seductive one for many
observers. Nevertheless, as in other areas of bilateral
exchanges, the extent of Sino-Indian cooperation in the field
of energy seems to have been greatly exaggerated. 
First of all, an analysis of the behaviour of Indian and Chinese
firms shows that the relationship is more typically character-
ized by often brutal competition. Since 2004, Indian firms in
direct competition with Chinese companies have lost a series
of bids for oil projects in Angola, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, and
Myanmar. (81) In a much rarer instance of an Indian firm
upstaging a Chinese firm with much greater experience in this
field, ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL, the foreign operations
arm of ONGC) outbid SINOPEC (China Petroleum &
Chemical Corporation) to acquire Imperial Energy, a British
firm that controlled parts of oil projects in Russia and
Kazakhstan, for $2.6 billion. (82) How could competition be
avoided when securing foreign energy supplies has become a
key national priority for both giants? During the first half of
this century, India and China will remain largely dependent
on coal, which they have in large quantities within their terri-
tories. (83) Their dependence on external sources for oil and gas
is expected to continue increasing sharply if both countries
keep growing at the rate they have in recent years. The
International Energy Agency projects that India’s dependence
on foreign energy sources will rise from 73 percent (in 2006)
to 91.6 percent by 2020. In China, which was energy self-suf-
ficient until the mid-1990s, dependence on foreign sources is
expected to rise to 50 percent in 2010 and to 77 percent in
2030. (84) Thus the two countries’ national independence relies
in part on access to new foreign energy sources. 
This increasing demand for hydrocarbons comes at time of
great uncertainty on the global oil scene. As latecomers,
China and India are not finding it easy to take on the major
oil giants, who have dominated the industry for more than a
century with remarkable stability. Whatever might be said of
their exploits in Africa, reports of which have eaten up acres
of newsprint in recent years, Chinese and Indian firms are
forced to make astronomical bids to gain entry into areas
where Western and Japanese companies have traditionally
held dominance. India and China have also had to deal with
countries deemed untouchable (albeit only in recent years)
by Western and Japanese firms for political reasons. Beijing
and New Delhi appear to be less worried about moral argu-
ments (as indeed Western governments had been until
recently), but this type of cooperation is not without political
cost, as demonstrated by the criticisms hurled at China over
its role in the Darfur crisis. (85) Sudan accounts for six percent
and five percent, respectively, of China’s and India’s foreign
oil supplies, (86) and the Sudanese government has granted 40
percent of the exploitation rights of its oilfields to China, 30
percent to Malaysia, and 25 percent to India. (87) The Chinese
government has been accused of closing its eyes to the Darfur
crisis and of economically sustaining the Khartoum regime,
which has faced several critical votes in the United Nations.
In early 2008, in the run-up to the Olympics in Beijing,
Chinese diplomats were forced to shed their reticence and
address mounting international criticism over their role in
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Sudan. (88) In Burma, the military, economic, and diplomatic
support given to the military regime by China and India in
exchange for the exploitation of natural gas resources has also
drawn fierce criticism from around the world. 
Sino-Indian competition is not limited to hydrocarbons; it is
equally fierce in the quest for other raw materials both coun-
tries lack. Phosphates, iron ore, nickel, lead, scrap iron, alu-
minium, leather, zinc, and tungsten (despite major domestic
resources of these in China’s case) are the subject of intense
competition, not only between China and India, but also
among other big countries. (89)
Finally, even when large Indian and Chinese energy groups
decide to collaborate, there is nothing to indicate that these
projects would be conducted in the framework of a strategic
and special relationship at the expense of their cooperation
with other countries. On the contrary, an analysis of the for-
eign cooperative ties of the two countries’ oil and gas giants
shows that their links to European, American, Russian,
Japanese, Saudi, and Australian companies and to major
developing countries such as Brazil, Chile, Iran, and
Venezuela are much longer, more numerous, and sustained.
As of late 2006, China National Offshore Oil Corp.
(CNOOC) had signed 182 contracts and agreements in the
oil domain with 76 companies from 21 countries. (90) Shell,
Exxon, Chevron, and Total are CNOOC’s major partners,
far ahead of any Indian companies. Of CNOOC’s 50 oil-
fields offshore of China, 27 are exploited jointly with foreign
companies, but no Indian firm was among them as of late
2006. The same situation pertains with regard to the other oil
and gas giant, SINOPEC: no Indian firm figures among its
strategic partners, while the company enjoys close cooperation
with major Western multinationals in both exploitation and
commercialisation. (91) Similarly, there is no indication that
China firms are about to overtake the cooperation Indian com-
panies have established with Western and Japanese compa-
nies or those from other developing countries. ONGC
Videsh, for instance, has much closer links to Brazil’s
Petrobras, having signed a series of strategic agreements in
2007. (92) Agreements signed with CNPC or SINOPEC are
in no way exclusive or different from many others that ONGC
Videsh has signed with foreign partners since early this
decade. (93) The same holds true for the Indian private group
Reliance. (94) Sino-Indian cooperation in energy is thus devoid
of any exclusivity: the importance of recent joint projects they
have launched are put in perspective by the older and more
sustained ties both sides maintain with other countries. China
and India have treated each other as potential alliance part-
ners in recent years for specific projects in the same way as
they have other state and private actors on the world energy
scene.
Given these facts, it is clear that despite the implementation
of a few joint projects in hydrocarbons since 2005, the two
countries are far from forging a strategic relationship in ener-
gy and raw materials. Cooperation between Chinese and
Indian firms appears for now to be more the exception than
the rule as the two engage in ruthless competition to secure
new foreign energy supplies.
P ra gmatic  al l ia nc es i n i nt er n ati on alec on omic  in s titu tio ns
Aware of the quasi-hegemonic role of the United States and
Europe in the Bretton Woods institutions created after the
end of World War II, Jawaharlal Nehru had, after India’s
independence in 1947, actively sought Chinese support to
counter the weight of the developed countries and to defend
the interests of developing ones. The Bandung conference in
April 1955, with 29 developing countries represented, was
a culmination of this strategy, in which India played a cen-
tral role. The impossibility of the Chinese Communist
regime’s participation in the Bretton Woods institutions until
the 1970s (when China at last took the seat occupied by
Taiwan), as well as the 1962 Sino-Indian war, put paid to
any hopes of building a strategic Beijing-New Delhi axis
aimed at defending the interests of developing countries.
Although China was reintegrated gradually into all interna-
tional organisations during the 1970s (UN) and 1980s
(IMF, World Bank), it was above all with the WTO acces-
sion in 2001, at a time of far-reaching reforms to the world
trade architecture, that the opportunity for a Beijing-New
Delhi axis arose again. The Doha Development Round of
the WTO, which commenced in 2001, was marked by
strong differences between the developed and developing
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countries, with India playing a particularly active role in
defending the latter’s interests. 
The Doha Round collapsed over a number of issues: (95)
• Farm subsidies in developed countries, especially EU
member-states;
• “Special products” that allow developing countries flexi-
bility by according the right to protect national producers
judged to be supplying goods crucial for food security and
rural development;
• Special safeguard mechanisms to allow developing coun-
tries to temporarily increase protectionist duties on some
basic farm products such as wheat and rice so as to pro-
tect their farmers during a time of rapid rise in imports; 
• Developed countries’ wish to include some minimum
social and trade union conditions in the WTO frame-
work;
• The possibility of defending fisheries in developing coun-
tries through subsidies authorised in the WTO frame-
work;
• Finally, the degree and speed of opening of the services
sector in developing countries.
As a newcomer in the WTO, China kept a low profile in
the Doha Round. Nevertheless, Beijing clearly aligned itself
with New Delhi’s stand on each of the issues, letting India
play the leader’s role during ministerial conferences. China
also weighed in to back India at crucial moments in the
negotiations. For instance, during the last ministerial of the
Doha Round at Geneva on 29 July 2008, China’s support
for India was crucial after Brazil defected and positioned
itself behind the developed countries. In April 2007, during
a meeting in Beijing between Commerce Minister Bo Xilai
and his Indian counterpart, Kamal Nath, the two sides
issued a joint declaration voicing a strong common position
in defence of developing countries’ interests. (96)
China and India have also defended shared stands in inter-
national negotiations on climate change, especially as
regards the establishment of rules that will take effect by the
end of the first stage, i.e. 2012, as envisaged in the Kyoto
Protocol. The two countries have made common cause over
the past several years, affirming this entente forcefully at the
last Climate Change Conference in Bali in December
2007 (97) by rejecting all attempts by developed countries
(except the United States) to impose quotas on the emission
of greenhouse gases. The two countries also joined hands to
reject the principle (proposed notably by France) of a tax on
imports of products from countries that have high rates of
greenhouse gas emissions. China and India also jointly pro-
posed the setting up of a fund financed by countries “histor-
ically” responsible for the greenhouse effect (United States
and Europe) to help fund innovations and technology trans-
fers to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
Seeing the impact of such alliances between India and
China, several analysts have spoken of a new era in interna-
tional economic organisations, especially the WTO.
Unthinkable only 15 years ago, given the state of their bilat-
eral ties and China’s limited participation in international
economic organisations, such alliances could be repeated in
future and could change the current power equations in
international negotiations. Nevertheless, such China-India
alliances can be expected to be limited to specific issues and
remain pragmatic, and are unlikely to lead to the formation
of a systematic axis for defending developing countries. The
numerous geostrategic rivalries examined in the first part of
this paper limit the extent of such alliances, which are still
largely dictated by specific convergences linked to the
defence of national interests and limited to some economic
issues. The lack of alliance between the two countries on
other matters, such as the reform of the United Nations and
the IMF, was demonstrated by China’s attitude toward
India’s aspirations to obtain a permanent seat in the UN
Security Council.Concl usion
In analysing various facets of Sino-Indian relations, the effort
here has been to show that behind the media and official
hyperbole over warming diplomatic and economic ties since
the early 1990s, the bilateral process remains entangled in a
series of geostrategic and economic rivalries. Beijing-New
Delhi relations continue to be dogged by mutual suspicion
inherited from the 1962 war, itself the result of the clash of
mutually irreconcilable nationalisms and ambitions toward
the Asian scene. In 1959, i.e. three years before the start of
the war, Jawaharlal Nehru had told Edgar Snow in an inter-
view that “the basic reason for the Sino-Indian dispute was
that they were both ‘new nations’ in that both were newly
independent and under dynamic nationalistic leaderships,
and in a sense were ‘meeting’ at their frontiers for the first
time in history.” (98) The Indian historian Ramachandra
Guha takes this further, insisting that the India-China con-
flict “was a clash of national myths, national egos, national
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insecurities and – ultimately and inevitably – national
armies.” (99)
The geopolitical context has of course changed greatly today,
but the clash of two nationalisms on the Asian scene contin-
ues to influence Sino-Indian relations. Some underlying ten-
sions felt during the 1950s, such as competition for Asian
leadership, and Beijing’s fear of military containment and of
a US-India alliance, continue to weigh heavily on bilateral
ties today. The 1950s also left behind heavy baggage in the
form of the Tibet issue, boundary demarcation, and Sino-
Pakistan relations. India’s military defeat in 1962 has
remained one of the greatest national humiliations of inde-
pendent India. It also completely destroyed the capital of con-
fidence placed in the neighbouring country by Nehru, one of
the fathers of modern India, and exposed the contradictions
and limits of India’s pursuit of the policy of non-alignment.
Nearly half a century later, the shockwaves of that war have
yet to wane in India’s political and military establishment.
Every time tensions increase between the two counties, the
past rises up to haunt the spirits of Indian leaders. 
A relationship based on pragmatism is the best that can
emerge from this loaded and complex heritage and its three
decades of “freeze.” As the above analysis indicates,
Beijing-New Delhi ties today are subjected more to tensions
that pit them against each other than joint projects that bring
them closer together. Normalisation of relations does not,
therefore, imply the emergence of a genuine strategic part-
nership; the hypothesis according to which development of
bilateral exchanges help sweep away rivalries, tensions, and
mutual suspicions appears to lack credibility. As Brahma
Chellaney of the Centre for Policy Research has said about
Sino-Japanese ties, “200 billion dollars’ bilateral trade
between China and Japan do not guarantee moderation and
restraint in bilateral relations when strategic animosities
remain unresolved.” (100) The “gentle commerce” between
people and nations, so dear to Montesquieu and Adam
Smith, today helps China and India to (re)discover each
other, (101) and to act together on specific issues in some mat-
ters of energy and environment and in the WTO framework.
But that does not amount to a magic wand that will wish
away the numerous problems that currently weigh down
bilateral relations, as well as both countries’ hegemonistic
ambitions in Asia. 
In other words, India and China are well on the way to
changing the world. (102) But they do so separately, through the
emergence of their respective economic and military might,
rather than through a strategic partnership, which for the
moment remains more a pious declaration than a reality. •
•Translated by N.Jayaram
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